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ESSAY
HIGH TECHNOLOGY JURISPRUDENCE: IN
DEFENSE OF "LOOK AND FEEL"
APPROACHES TO COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION
Carl A. Sundholmt
I. INTRODUCTION
This essay comments on current directions and issues in com-
puter copyright litigation respecting the so-called "look and feel"
approach taken by courts to the application of substantial similarity
tests in determining copyright infringement of computer programs
and audiovisual displays. The evolving case law still walks the clas-
sic copyright tightrope between the dialectic of the reward and pro-
tection of innovation in the field, on the one hand, and preventing
the unwarranted monopolization of ideas which retard innovation,
competition, and progress, on the other. Although the balancing of
these opposing ideals by recent court decisions appears increasingly
to favor the strengthening of copyright protection for computer
programs and output as set out by the Whelan I and Broderbund 2
courts, the so-called "look and feel" approach embodied by these
decisions has generated a great deal of vigorous attack and contro-
versy which has clouded the value of the new integrative test. This
essay speaks in defense of what its critics have characterized as the
"look and feel" approach, the integrative approach to high technol-
ogy jurisprudence.
Copyright © 1991 by Carl A. Sundholm. All Rights Reserved.
t J.D. Santa Clara University School of Law; Ph.D. University of California, Davis;
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1. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
2. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D.
Cal. 1986).
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II. CULTURAL LAG & HIGH TECHNOLOGY JURISPRUDENCE
One recurrent characteristic of the relationship between tech-
nological and legal change is that the latter tends to lag behind the
former. This observation is not new. It was in 1922 when William
F. Ogbur first coined the term "cultural lag" to refer to the charac-
teristic gap created when the faster rate of technological change in
the material culture of a society outraces the slower moving non-
material culture, which includes law.3 Such a "cultural lag" syn-
drome has not only characterized the initial response of American
courts to the prospect of applying traditional copyright rules to new
computer technology, but still continues to present a backlash of
criticism against the more progressive high technology jurispru-
dence presented in the Whelan and Broderbund court decisions.
However, as Dean Roscoe Pound suggested, one of the primary
tasks of the law is social engineering4 and the test of time will be
which approach to copyright protection provided the wisest ap-
proach for the social engineering of the development of progress in
the computer high technology field. I submit that the Whelan/
Broderbund integrative approach5 provides the best means to attain
this goal.
In the mid 1980s, when I wrote Computer Copyright Infringe-
ment: Beyond the Limits of the Iterative Test,6 the field of computer
3. WILLIAM F. OGBURN, SOCIAL CHANGE: WITH RESPECT TO CULTURE AND ORIG-
INAL NATURE 203 (Rev. Ed. 1950).
4. RoscoE POUND, THE SPIRrr OF THE COMMON LAW 195 (1921).
5. For readers without a background in this area, it should be noted that a court's
decision as to whether one copyrighted computer program/display is infringed by that of an
alleged copy is generally accomplished by the application of a "substantial similarity test"
which compares and/or contrasts the two products to determine the nature and extent of
impermissible appropriation. Broadly, such tests are classifiable along a continuum from re-
strictive approaches which tend to be more favorable to Defendants (including the "iterative"
approach which requires point-by-point copying to find infringement) to protectionist ap-
proaches which are more favorable to Plaintiffs (including the instant "integrative" Whelani
Broderbund test which allows enforcement of copyright in non-literal copying situations and
integrates both analytic and synthetic comparisons, expert and ordinary observer viewpoints,
and emphasizes an open approach to integrate various forms of evidence of copying, includ-
ing non-literal paraphrasing and translation between computer programs to assure adequate
protection against those who misappropriate the intellectual property of others, but add slight
alterations to avoid prosecution).
6. Carl A. Sundholm, Comment, Computer Copyright Infringement: Beyond the Limits
of the Iterative Test, 3 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369 (1987) [hereinafter
Sundholm II]. The first article I published on this topic, Carl A. Sundholm, Note, Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs Extends Beyond Literal Duplication to Structure, Sequence,
and Organization, 3 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 221 (1987) [hereinafter
Sundholm I], was a casenote review of the Whelan decision noting the significance and impli-
cations of the innovative approach taken by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in that case.
Sundholm II is a much more comprehensive review of the history of all prior case law deci-
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copyright litigation was in the early stages of its development and
the case law was in a state of flux and contradiction. The rapidity
with which innovation in computer technology was taking place left
courts with the prospect of stretching traditional constitutionally-
based concepts of copyright law originally drawn from expressive
works such as books and artistic creations. However, when it be-
came clear that the traditional notions were unable to protect this
new form of intellectual property, courts, rather than leaping into
the abyss and extending protection to the newly disenfranchised in-
ventors, shrank from the task and stubbornly refused to protect
these emerging forms of intellectual property.
III. PRE-WHELAN CASE LAW
The first such manifestation of the "cultural lag" of legal anal-
ysis behind technological change was found in the reasoning of the
court in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.7
Although the Synercom court had the first opportunity to develop a
new high technology jurisprudence by creatively enlarging tradi-
tional copyright substantial similarity tests to protect emerging
computer subject matter, it chose not to meet the task. On the con-
trary, it refused to protect the new subject matter by taking a con-
servative anti-protectionist approach which ultimately resurfaced in
later court opinions. The Synercom analysis inappropriately analo-
gized computer input formats to the "H" pattern on an automobile
gearshift knob and held that the expression of the idea in input for-
mats was too limited by the technology and too functional to be
copyright protected.'
Some commentators at the time reinforced this overly con-
servative anti-protectionist position by advocating an "iterative ap-
proach" which restricted copyright protection for computer
sions on computer copyright substantial similarity tests. It offers a systematic typology cate-
gorizing each approach, an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the prior
approaches, and a proposal for a systematic new "integrative" approach which combines the
strengths and minimizes the weaknesses of prior approaches. The instant essay assumes that
the reader has a basic understanding of the current technological background, legal history
and issues concerning computer copyright law. For background review of the case law, see
Daniel A.D. Hunter, Protecting the "Look and Feel" of Computer Software in the United
States and Australia, 7 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 95 (1991) [hereinafter
Hunter], and the succinct summary by the court in Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software
Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990), discussed infra note 34 and accompanying text.
7. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D.
Tex. 1978).
8. This view has been corrected by the opinion in Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. 1127,
where input formats in screen displays were held protectable by copyright.
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programs to cases containing literal phrase-by-phrase copying.9
The Synercom court was not alone. Other early court decisions
compounded the "cultural lag" of the law behind technology by
adopting the "iterative test" and taking an anti-protectionist copy-
right approach which favored defendant-appropriators over plain-
tiff-inventors. This "iterative" approach dominated the early line of
cases concerning computer programs copyrighted as "literary
works." 10 Virtually every pre-Whelan "literary work" case took an
anti-protectionist "iterative" approach requiring evidence of literal
copying in order to find copyright infringement of the computer
program." Although all of these cases required proof of literal
copying before infringement could be found, the later cases con-
tained dicta indicating that "copying of the organization and struc-
tural details" can form the basis for infringement. "2 In addition, the
early courts took a restrictive view which favored defendants, by
holding that either computer program similarities were "func-
tional" and noncopyrightable, 13 or that the structure, sequence or
organization of computer programs and output was unprotectable
by an overbroad definition of the idea behind the program, which is
not protectable. In essence, the Synercom court held that the idea
merged with the expression. The technical nature of the com-
puter program media also led these early courts to focus on expert
dissection of similarities and differences in the programs.
9. Howard Root, Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification
of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1264 (1984). John Pinheiro & Gerard
Lacroix, Protecting the "Look and Feel" of Computer Software, 1 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 411 (1986) also appears to advocate an iterative approach, stating that
"[t]he peculiar nature of computer software suggests that a court should limit the category of
literary works to a program's code." Id. at 432.
10. Although computer programs were previously copyrightable as "literary works" or
"audiovisual works," the Copyright Office has adopted a policy that a single registration of a
computer program also protects its audiovisual aspects. See Letter from the Copyright Office
(Jan. 20, 1987), reprinted in Computer Screen Displays of Text Are Not Independently Regis.
trable, 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 825, at 613-614 (April 9, 1987).
I1. Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg.
Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); In the Matter of Certain Personal Com-
puters and the Components Thereof, Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) Paragraph 25,651 at 18,927-9
(1984); E. F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (C.D. Minn. 1985);
SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Q-Co
Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). For a review of these cases, see
Sundholm II, supra note 6.
12. SAS Inst., 605 F. Supp. at 830.
13. Q-Co, 625 F. Supp. 608, at 615-16.
14. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D.
Tex. 1978). This idea-expression merger view has also been applied to computer output in
audiovisual display form in Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.
1981).
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At the same time, a second line of cases was evolving where
computer program output displays were copyrighted as "audiovi-
sual works" (initially these cases were restricted to computer audio-
visual game displays) with courts applying more liberal substantial
similarity tests that were generally more favorable to plaintiffs. Be-
cause of the visual nature of the media, courts tended to apply the
more protectionist traditional ordinary observer tests which either
looked to the synthetic overall similarity of the works' 5, or analyti-
cally dissected the similarities and differences of the works 6, or at-
tempted to incorporate both approaches into a two-stage "extrinsic/
intrinsic" test. 7
Against this historical backdrop arrived two cases which revo-
lutionized and broadened both lines of case law. The landmark case
of Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. "8 was
the first computer program case to move beyond the "iterative" test
literal duplication requirement, to find copyright infringement
where there was only non-literal substantial similarity in the general
structure, sequence and organization between defendant's and
plaintiff's computer programs.
Following on the heels of Whelan came Broderbund Software,
Inc. v. Unison World, Inc, 9 which was the first audiovisual display
copyright case to hold that the structure, sequence and organization
of non-game computer program audiovisual displays were protected
by copyright.20
15. Atari, Inc. v. Armenia, Ltd., [1981] Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) Paragraph 25,328
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 1981); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d
607 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
16. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981); Atari, Inc. v.
Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981); cf. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d
464 (2nd Cir. 1946) (analytical dissection of the similarities and differences in sound
recordings).
17. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonalds' Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982).
18. Whelan Assocs., Inc., v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). For a summary of Whelan, see Sundholm I, supra note 6,
and for a summary of Broderbund, see Sundholm II, supra note 6, at 380. Suffice to say, both
courts advocated an "integrative" approach to the application of substantial similarity tests
to determine copyright infringement of computer programs and audiovisual works. This ap-
proach flexibly combined prior tests in a simultaneous evaluation of the works in question
from the standpoints of both an ordinary observer and expert witness using both a synthetic
"overall" comparison and a detailed analytic point-by-point comparison which included non-
literal similarities.
19. Broderbund Software, Inc., v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal.
1986).
20. Id. at 1133. During this formative time, it was unclear whether Whelan and
Broderbund were mere aberrations of "maverick" courts or the wave of the future. These
two seminal cases were decided as I was writing early drafts of Computer Copyright Infringe-
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IV. AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT AND RESPONSE TO THE
WHELAN-BRODERBUND INTEGRATIVE APPROACH
No sooner was the ink dry on the Whelan and Broderbund
opinions, than courts and critics alike began to attack.
A. Responses of Other Courts
The response of other courts as to the Whelan/Broderbund
revolution has generally been mixed. However, the lack of a uni-
form substantial similarity test for computer copyright still poses a
problematic lack of consistency and predictability in court decisions
as to whether a given work will be protected.
Several courts have rejected or criticized the progressive Whe-
lan/Broderbund approach. The computer program copyright case
of Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Serv., Inc.21 expressly
rejected the Whelan test in favor of the archaic Synercom test. An
early audiovisual computer copyright case which criticized the
Whelan/Broderbund approach was Digital Communications Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp.22 which not only applied
the 9th Circuit Krofft two-step test for substantial similarity,2" but
ment: Beyond the Limits of the Iterative Test, 3 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 369 (1987), which attacked the inadequacies of prior "iterative" substantial similarity
tests and the lack of any uniform substantial similarity test in the field and proposed a new
integrative non-literal test. I revised the article to incorporate the consistent approaches
taken by the Whelan and Broderbund courts as holding the most promise for handling com-
puter copyright disputes in the future as far more preferable than the traditional "iterative
test" or the Krofft two-stage test for the increasing complexities of high technology subject
matter. The article then proposed a new alternative for a uniform substantial similarity test
which is consonant with the Whelan and Broderbund approaches: an "integrative" test
which is non-literal, flexibly integrates prior substantial similarity tests and is open to "cross-
over" circumstantial evidence from manuals, program development notes, reasonable devel-
opment time, and the like to assess the likelihood of illegal copying. Sundholm II, supra note
6, at 399-403.
21. Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256
(5th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987); see the discussion of the logical flaws in this
court opinion in Sundholm II, supra note 6, at 387-88 n.75.
22. Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449
(N.D. Ga. 1987).
23. The 9th Circuit Krofft two-step test, and the 2nd circuit Arnstein test upon which it
is based (Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946)), is ostensibly maladapted to com-
puter copyright because the first phase attempts to determine whether the idea was copied
using an expert dissection test and the second phase determines whether the expression was
copied using an ordinary observer overall similarity test. The problem in applying these two-
stage tests to computer copyrights is that both the Krofft or Arnstein tests prohibit expert
testimony evidence in the critical determination of whether defendant's expression infringes
upon that of plaintiff's computer program. Obviously, this exclusion of expert evidence is
such a handicap in applying the two-stage test to computer subject matter where expert evi-
dence is critical that most courts applying the two-stage test in computer copyright cases
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also embarrassingly made an erroneous criticism of the Broderbund
case by stating:
One court, however, has gone a step further than Whelan and
has concluded that a computer program's copyright protection
extends to its audiovisual screen displays. Broderbund Software,
Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal.
1986).24
This meritless criticism is based upon a misreading of the
Broderbund opinion. The Broderbund court never had a computer
program copyright before it (the only copyright was on the audiovi-
sual display) and certainly Broderbund never held that the copy-
right on a computer program extended to protect an uncopyrighted
audiovisual display. The Broderbund court merely applied the non-
iterative reasoning of Whelan to audiovisual copyright subject
matter and ruled that an audiovisual copyright protects the struc-
ture, sequence and organization of screen displays. Unfortunately,
over-eager opponents of Broderbund, including both courts and
commentators, 25  have repeated the misguided criticism that
Broderbund "rests upon faulty premises' 2 6 without bothering to
have complied with the ritual application of the test, but have implicitly disregarded the test
by still basing their decision upon expert testimony and analytic dissection. See the criticism
of the two-stage approaches in Sundholm II, supra note 6, at 402. It should also be noted
that the Broderbund court recognized there was a shortcoming of this two-stage test by not-
ing that, although it was bound to apply the Krofft two-stage approach, the preferable ap-
proach established by Whelan of "an integrated substantial similarity test pursuant to which
both lay and expert testimony would be admissible... may well be the wave of the future in
this area." Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1136.
24. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 455-456.
25. Hunter, supra note 6, at 97, 116; Christian Nadan, A Proposal to Recognize Compo-
nent Works How a Teddy Bears on the Competing Ends of Copyright Law, 78 CAL. L. Rv.
1633, 1643 (1990).
26. Nadan, supra note 25, at 1646 (citing Manufacturer Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS,
Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989)), and stating: "Not only is Whelan's result harmful,
its logic is misguided." Nadan, supra note 25, at 1648. See also Jeffrey R. Benson, Note,
Copyright Protection for Computer Screen Displays, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1123 (1988), errone-
ously stating:
The court in Whelan never suggested the program's copyright extended
beyond the program code to embrace its screen display. Despite the
Broderbund court's professed reliance on Whelan, therefore, its extension of a
program's copyright to the structure, sequence and organization of its screens
is without precedent.
Id. at 1145. (emphasis added). Another anti-Whelan/lBroderbund commentator, Gregory C.
Damman in Copyright of Computer Display Screens: Summary and Suggestions, 9 CoM-
PUTER/L.J. 417 (1989), claims that the Whelan holding that "the screen display could serve
as indirect evidence of copying of the program code," id. at 425, was erroneously interpreted
by the Broderbund court which
held that Whelan stood for the proposition that 'copyright protection is not
limited to the literal aspects of a computer program, but rather extends to the
1992]
216 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY L4WJOURNAL [Vol. 8
verify the inaccurate summary against the original opinion. The
Manufacturer Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc.27 court was also
critical of the integrative Whelan approach, as apparent in its re-
peating the misguided criticism of the Broderbund court made by
the Softklone court.28
Despite the opinion of these courts, the majority of subsequent
cases have supported the Whelan/Broderbund protectionist ap-
proach to computer copyright cases. In Pearl Systems, Inc. v. Com-
petition Electronics, Inc.,29 the court adopted the Whelan!
Broderbund integrative substantial similarity test in using both ex-
pert dissection and ordinary observer "total concept and feel" to
find infringement of a computer program copyright by non-literal
organizational copying. The Ninth Circuit Court in Johnson Con-
trols, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Systems, Inc.,30 applied the Whelan
integrative test using analytic dissection and expert evidence (while
apparently abandoning any pretense of applying the awkward
Krofft3' two-stage test) in upholding a copyright infringement find-
ing where there was only substantial similarity in the structure, se-
quence, and organization of the computer program and no literal
copying. A second Ninth Circuit case, Telemarketing Resources v.
overall structure of a program, including its audiovisual displays [and that]
[t]he court's error touched off a flurry of criticism from commentators and
other courts facing the issue of the copyrightability of computer screen
displays.
Id. at 425 (citing Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1133 (emphasis added)). J. Scott MacKay,
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.: 'ook and Feel" Copyright Protection for
the Display Screens of an Application Microcomputer Program, 13 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 105, 126-129, 129 n.181 (1987) also uncritically parrots the aforementioned criti-
cism of Broderbund.
27. CAMS, 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989). This case was the first to be heard after
the Copyright office announced its new policy of considering any computer copyright to ex-
tend to both audiovisual and program aspects. Id. at 990-91.
28. The CAMS court stated that Broderbund
held that the copyright in a computer program extends beyond the literal pro-
gram codes to the structures of that program including its audiovisual displays.
However, in reaching this conclusion, the court appears to have misinterpreted
the Third Circuit's holding in Whelan.... The Broderbund court extended the
reach of Whelan by equating computer program copyright protection for the
structure, sequence, and organization of a program with protection of the
screen outputs .... In doing so, it overextended the scope of scope [sic] of
copyright protection applicable to those screen displays.
Id. at 992
29. Pearl Sys., Inc. v. Competition Elecs., Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1520 (S.D. Fla.
1988).
30. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1989).
31. See Krofft, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Symantec Corp.,2 called upon the court "to decide whether the
'look and feel' of the screen displays in defendants' computer outlin-
ing program are substantially dissimilar from plaintiffs'.""3 Here
the court cited the Whelan/Broderbund test with approval, but ac-
tually applied the Krofft two-stage test and found that the program
screen displays were not substantially similar as a matter of law.
The court held the resemblance found on the first stage was at the
idea level embodied in an outlining program and not the expression
level. In Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Intl. ". the
court expressly approved the Whelan/Broderbund integrative test
when it was applied to determine that non-essential aspects of the
screen display of Plaintiff's computer spreadsheet program (Lotus
1-2-3) were infringed by non-literal copying in Defendant's spread-
sheet (V-P Planner). The Lotus court's progressive scholarly opin-
ion expressly and faithfully follows the Whelan/Broderbund
integrative test by incorporating both expert and ordinary observer
viewpoints, using both analytic dissection of similarities and differ-
ences and overall "concept and feel" evaluations, and by recogniz-
ing that it is "not a step-by-step decision making process, but a
simultaneous weighing of all the factors or elements that the legal
test identifies as relevant."35
B. Rebuttal to Responses of Commentators
The Whelan and Broderbund opinions and the underlying in-
tegrative test have polarized legal commentators and have been a
lightening rod for criticism, most of which is based upon mis-
characterizations and the unjustified fears of monopoly.
1. The Whelan/Broderbund Integrative Test is not a
"Look And Feel" approach.
Many critics have set up and knocked down a "scarecrow"
mischaracterization of the Whelan/Broderbund position. One such
"scarecrow" is the fundamentally inaccurate portrayal of the in-
tegrative test as a "look and feel" approach. That expression was
originally a modification of the earlier phrase "total concept and
feel" which was originally used in Roth Greeting Cards v. United
32. Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991 (N.D.
Cal. 1989).
33. Id. at 1992.
34. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
35. Id. at 61.
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Card Co.,36 and Krofft 37 to denote the court's evaluation of substan-
tial similarity exclusively from (1) the perspective of an ordinary
observer or consumer rather than an expert and (2) using a syn-
thetic, gestalt or overall similarity approach rather than an analytic
dissection involving systematic comparison of similarities and dif-
ferences. This "total concept and feel" approach or "audience over-
all similarity test" is merely one of the six types of substantial
similarity tests3" used by courts in the field and is only represented
by Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics
Corp. 39 and Atari, Inc. v. Armenia, Ltd.'" The "total concept and
feel" approach also constitutes the second "intrinsic" stage of the
Krofft test.
However, it is extremely misleading and inaccurate to refer to
the integrative tests employed in Whelan, Broderbund or their prog-
eny as "look and feel" approaches because they also utilize both
expert opinion and analytic dissection. The phrase "look and feel"
has been used primarily by the critics of the integrative test to set up
a "straw man," a misleading image of an impressionistic, unsys-
tematic, arbitrary, and dangerous test of substantial similarity
which is set up for easy criticism.4 Such critiques of "straw man"
mischaracterizations do little to advance the state of high technol-
36. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th. Cir. 1970).
37. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1167 (9th Cir. 1977). Note that the phrase "total concept and feel" appears to have been first
imported into computer copyright cases in 1982 by Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Con-
sumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
38. In Sundholm II, supra note 6, it was pointed out that all substantial similarity tests
fall into one of six types based upon whether the court uses an expert or ordinary observer
viewpoint, uses an analytic dissection or synthetic overall impression evaluation, and allows
only literal or nonliteral comparisons: (1) an expert overall similarity test, (2) an audience
overall similarity test, (3) an audience analytic similarity test, (4) an expert analytic similarity
test, (5) two-stage tests, such as Arnstein and Krofft, and (6) non-literal integrative tests, such
as Whelan and Broderbund. Id. at 390-99.
39. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.
1982) was concerned with whether the "total concept and feel of K.C. Munchkin" was sub-
stantially similar to that of Pac Man as experienced by the ordinary player.
40. The court used an ordinary observer standpoint to compare the overall similarity of
Atari's Centipedes to Armenia's "War of the Bugs." Atari, Inc. v. Armenia, Ltd., [1981]
Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) Paragraph 25,328 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 3, 1981).
41. See Hunter, supra note 6; G. Gervaise Davis III, Computer Software-The Final
Frontier: Clones, Compatibility and Copyright, COMPUTER LAW., June 1985, at 1. Pinheiro &
Lacroix, supra note 9, at 416 define the "look and feel" of a computer program as its "design,
presentation and output as experienced by the user" (citing Jack Russo & Douglas K. Der-
win, Copyright in the "Look and Feel" of Computer Software, COMPUTER LAW., February
1985, at 1, 11 n.8), and conclude "a program's look and feel should not be granted protection
under copyright law," Pinheiro & Lacroix, supra note 9, at 415, and state that "[i]f a court
applied this [Whelan] definition of expression broadly, then a software's design, presentation,
output and user interface all would receive copyright protection." Id. at 425.
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ogy jurisprudence. The term "integrative test"'42 should be used be-
cause it is more descriptive and less misleading.
2. The Whelan and Broberbund cases do not extend
computer copyright protection too far.
Opponents have also used the argumentum ad absurdum tech-
nique and raised the specter of the wholesale repression of high
technology progress and scare tactics claiming the Whelan-
Broderbund "look and feel" approach would lead to the monopoli-
zation by larger companies crushing smaller competitors by the
steamroller of overbroad copyright protection. Needless to say, the
Whelan and Broderbund cases have been extant for more than five
years, other cases adopting their position have accumulated, and
the forecasted specter of monopoly has not materialized.
Some critics attack the Whelan court's decision based upon
where the line was drawn between expression and idea.43 Peter
42. The use of the term "integrative test" is proposed in Sundholm II, supra note 6, at
371, 399-404 see also Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232-33 and Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1136.
Moreover, the use of the "look and feel" expression should be abandoned because imprecise
language perpetuates confusion and inconsistency. In addition to referring to audience over-
all similarity tests, the phrase "look and feel" is also occasionally, variously, and ambiguously
used to refer to expert analytic dissection non-literal similarity tests, expert overall non-literal
similarity tests, and also non-literal similarity tests in general. For instance, the Hunter arti-
cle, supra note 7, variously uses "look and feel" to refer to non-literal aspects, id. at 97,
audiovisual aspects, id., the audiovisual work stream of computer cases, id. at 153, non-literal
display of screen sequence, id. at 98, and the Whelan/Broderbund case approaches and their
successors, id. at 115.
43. Whelan stated that the idea of a dental inventory computer program could have
many different expressions in its sequence, structure and organization.
The "expression of the idea" in a software computer program is the manner in
which the program operates, controls and regulates the computer in receiving,
assembling, calculating, retaining, correlating, and producing useful informa-
tion either on a screen, printout or by audio communication.
Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239. "Where there are various means of achieving the desired purpose,
then the particular means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence, there is expression,
not idea." Id. at 1236. Charles Walter criticized Whelan:
With cavalier disregard for logic, language and 17 U.S.C. Section 102(b), the
Third Circuit equated purpose or function with "idea," and everything not
necessary to that purpose or function was equated with "expression." This led
the Third Circuit to the incorrect distinction between "expression" and "idea."
... This analysis ignored the fact that, while the merger doctrine can be used
to identify expression which is not within the scope of copyright protection, it
cannot be used to identify all expression which is not in the scope of copyright
protection.
Charles Walter, Defining the Scope of Software Copyright Protection for Maximum Public
Benefit, 14 RUTrERs COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 130-31 (1988). Mr. Walter is being very
unfair to the Whelan court and displays his own "cavalier disregard for logic" by setting up
and knocking down yet another "straw man." As the Whelan court never stated that every
aspect of the varying means for accomplishing the purpose of a computer program constitutes
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Mennell ineffectually criticized the Whelan opinion by setting up
another "straw man" and using the argumentum ad absurdum
technique when claiming that Whelan's reasoning would mean a
cookbook organized by courses in a meal, a dictionary organized
alphabetically or a history book organized by historical epochs
would be copyrightable.45 Christian H. Nadan also argues ad ab-
surdum claiming that the specter of overbroad "look and feel" pro-
tection will chill U.S. software developers, undermine economic
incentive for software development, and display unwarranted hostil-
ity toward copyright defendants. 4 These arguments are based
upon mischaracterization and "beg the question" by assuming the
so-called "look and feel" approach makes protection dangerously
overbroad. These critics believe it will have a chilling effect on in-
copyrightable expression, it is unfair and misleading to criticize Whelan as though it did.
Similarly, another Whelan-Broderbund critic, J. Scott MacKay, goes so far as to recommend
that courts employ the "useful article" doctrine as the best approach rather than the idea/
expression test. MacKay, supra note 26, at 134. MacKay argues for non-protection of utili-
tarian aspects of the interface under the "useful article" doctrine which holds that "the only
elements of an application program's interface eligible for copyright protection are those that
can be separated from, and exist independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the interface."
Id. at 130-31. The problem with this type of approach is that it fails to understand that, due
to the fundamental difference between literary/artistic works and computer programs/dis-
plays, most aspects of computer subject matter are useful or utilitarian. This type of ap-
proach impractically restricts copyright protection to the useless and valueless aspects of the
computer subject matter. Thus the "useful article" doctrine holds little promise as "the" test
for computer copyright infringement cases. Pinheiro & Lacroix also argue that Whelan's
approach "fails" to distinguish between a program's expression and its underlying process or
function because they simply do not like where Whelan draws the line. Pinheiro & Lacroix,
supra note 9, at 427. For a criticism of Broderbund, see Robert E. Rudnick, Comment, Man-
ufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc.: A False Hope for Software Developers Seeking
Copyright Protection for Their Generated Screen Displays, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 211 (1991).
44. Peter Mennell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Pro-
grams, 41 STAN. L. Rnv. 1045 (1989).
45. The [Whelan] court's approach did not, however, pay adequate attention to
the implications of broad protection for the structure, sequence, and organiza-
tion of application program code. Perhaps more significantly with regard to
fundamental copyright principles, the Whelan court naively reasoned that be-
cause a function could be performed in more than one way, its structure, se-
quence, and organization is expressive and therefore copyrightable. A few
simple examples bring out the inconsistency of this reasoning with well-estab-
lished copyright principles. Under the Whelan approach, a culinary writer
would have an arguable claim that his cookbook's structure based upon the
order of courses in a meal is copyrightable because the function-a book ex-
pressing recipes--can be expressed in other ways. Similarly, a lexicographer
could seek protection for a dictionary in alphabetical order because surely
there are other ways of writing a book that defines words; and a historian could
seek copyright protection for chronological presentation of a particular period.
Id. at 1084-5.
46. Nadan, supra note 25, at 1650-51.
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novation and progress and then claim those very "defects" as evi-
dence of its shortcomings.
Critics have also claimed that overbroad "look and feel" pro-
tection allegedly embodied by the Whelan/Broderbund approach
encourages monopoly and discourages progress because it protects
the most efficient structure, sequence or organization of a computer
program in completing a particular task.4 7 Other critics have ex-
tended this argument to the untenable assertion that the Whelan
test should be limited by only protecting expressions of the struc-
ture, sequence and organization of programs that have no economic
value in increasing computing efficiency.4" The problem with these
arguments is that they would have copyright only protect valueless
aspects of inventions. If the computer program or audiovisual dis-
play were of no economic or technological value, why would any-
one want to copyright it to begin with?
Furthermore, these arguments are fallacious because the mis-
characterization results in overlooking the fact that the integrative
test still allows each court to limit any potential for monopolization
which would be counterproductive to high technology progress.
Courts are still free to apply the idea-expression test to protect gen-
47. Pamela Samuelson, "Why the Look and Feel of Software User Interfaces Should
Not Be Protected By Copyright Law," 32 COMM. OF ACM 563 (1989). MacKay, supra
note 26, argues that
the Broderbund decision goes against the policies and purposes of copyright
law. If this decision is followed by other courts, competition in the software
industry will be lessened, innovation in the development of interfaces will be
slowed, and consumers will be forced to pay monopoly prices to developers
undeserving of the enjoyment of such a powerful incentive.
Id. at 134.
The rationale used in Broderbund has the potential to cripple competition in
the computer software industry. The Broderbund analysis, if followed by other
courts, will allow the first software developer to market its product to obtain a
monopoly on the most efficient and logical interface for that program.
Id. at 135-6. See also Damman, supra note 26, at 444-5, recommending against copyright of
sequence and order of screen display on anti-monopoly grounds; Rudnick, supra note 43, at
245, claiming that "[a] 'look and feel' analysis would unjustifiably benefit the plaintiff in an
infringement suit"; Walters, supra note 43, at 150, arguing that "the scope of copyright pro-
tection should not extend to the user interface."
48. Mennell, supra note 44, at 1085; Benson, supra note 26, at 1153 claims that
"[g]ranting expansive copyright protection to a technology such as a screen design risks giv-
ing the developer a virtual monopoly over a process or system for performing a given task."
See also MacKay, supra note 26; Richard A. Forsten, It Walks and Talks Like My Duck, So
How Come It's Not Infringement?: The Case Against "Look and Feel" Protection for Com-
puter Programs, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 639 (1988); Pinheiro and Lacroix,
supra note 9.
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eralized "building block" ideas or to apply the merger doctrine4 9 to
protect "bottleneck" areas of innovation where the expressions of
ideas are unreasonably limited. The originality requirement still
must be met,50 and courts are free to refuse protection of obvious
expressions. 1 Finally, the "scenes afaire" doctrine, 2 and the blank
forms doctrine of Baker v. Selden 53 may be used to limit any
counterproductive monopolization interfering with high technology
progress. In fact, the Lotus court, 4 which used the Whelan integra-
tive test, specifically ruled that the idea of a general spreadsheet
format itself and the L-shaped screen format of a spreadsheet were
on the general idea level, obvious, unoriginal and not copyrightable.
Therefore, the arguments that Whelan or Broderbund threaten the
marketplace of innovation because of where the idea-expression line
is drawn are without merit.5
Other critics have accepted the mistaken criticism by the Soft-
klone court claiming that the Broderbund court erroneously held
that a computer program copyright extends to protect the otherwise
uncopyrighted audiovisual displays.56 For example, Hunter states
Broderbund "confused the copyright in the audiovisual display of a
program with the separate copyright in the literary work."5s7 Ben-
49. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.
1971).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
51. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp 37, 58-9 (D. Mass.
1990).
52. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th
Cir. 1982).
53. Baker v. Selden, 101 US. 99 (1879).
54. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 65-6.
55. See also David Ladd & Bruce G. Joseph, Expanding Computer Software Protection
by Limiting the Idea, 2 J. L. & TECH. 5, 10 (1987). Note also that the otherwise sound work
of NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT has criticized Whelan as extending copyright protection too far,
stating that [Whelan's]
sweeping rule and broad language extend copyright protection too far. Provid-
ing protection for such amorphous concepts as the "overall structure" of a
program, without considering whether such a structure is protectable under
traditional copyright theories, increases the risk of granting copyright holders
protection on a par with that provided to patent holders. Such a result could
be disastrous ....
3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1][d]
(1991). This observer doubts that Professor Nimmer would have approved this updated com-
mentary as it is inconsistent with the general statements of copyright law contained in his
authoritative treatise and it misreads Whelan as extending protection to overall structure of a
program without any consideration of its copyrightability.
56. Manufacturer Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 991 n.112 (D.
Conn. 1989).
57. Hunter, supra note 6, at 97. This is not the only mischaracterization in the Hunter
article. Hunter also apparently mischaracterizes my own work. For instance, Hunter, supra
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son's praise of the position of the Softklone court over that of the
Whelan/Broderbund courts also leads to an erroneous acceptance
of the Softklone court's error by claiming: "The court in Whelan
never suggested the program's copyright extended beyond the pro-
gram code to embrace its screen display. Despite the Broderbund
court's professed reliance on Whelan, therefore, its extension of a
program's copyright to the structure, sequence and organization of
its screens is without precedent."58 Nadan is another critic of
Broderbund who parrots this misguided criticism59 claiming that
Broderbund "rests upon faulty premises," citing the re-hashing of
the Softklone error in the CAMS court opinion and stating, "Not
only is Whelan's result harmful, its logic is misguided."'  In a simi-
lar vein, Peter Mennell has also stated:
The Broderbund decision has been roundly criticized for infer-
ring from Whelan that the copyright in the application program
code extends to the video displays. See Digital Communications
Associates v. Softklone, 659 F. Supp 449, 2 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1385
(ND Ga. 1987); 1. Scott MacKay, Broderbund Software v. Uni-
son World, Inc.: "Look and Feel" Copyright Protection for the
Display Screens of an Application Microcomputer Program, 13
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 105, 126 (1987). Notwith-
standing this apparent error, the substance of the Broderbund
court's approach-applying Whelan's idea/expression test to the
overall structure, sequence, and organization of screen dis-
plays-has been followed. See Digital Communications, 659 F.
Supp. 449.61
note 6, at 107-108 cites both of my 1987 articles, Sundhohn I, supra note 6 and Sundholm II,
supra note 6, for support of his statement that the Whelan decision that structure was proper
subject matter for copyright has been widely criticized, inaccurately implying that I was
critical of the Whelan decision. Moreover, Hunter, supra note 6, at 110-111 states: "The
expansion of the bounds of copyright in computer programs came under a great deal of scru-
tiny and criticism, particularly after Whelan. Carl Sundholm addresses the three main argu-
ments against the adoption of Whelan." This appears to give the wrong impression that I
was making those arguments when in fact I was attacking those three assumptions commonly
used to support the iterative test and criticize Whelan. Although Hunter repeats my critique
of these assumptions, he gives the untutored reader the mistaken impression that I supported
the anti-Whelan presumptions which I was actually attacking. For instance, in Sundholm II,
supra note 6, at 401, I criticized the third assumption of the iterative test that to extend
copyright protction to a computer program's structure would stifle stepping stone innovation
on two grounds. First, it mistakenly assumes that near-literal copying is necessary for pro-
gress in the programming field and, second, it uses circular reasoning which takes the as-
sumption that non-literal copyright protection is a block to progress and then invokes that
very assumption as "evidence" supporting denial of such protection.
58. Benson, supra note 26, at 1145.
59. Nadan, supra note 25, at 1646.
60. Id. at 1648.
61. Mennell, supra note 44, at 1090 n.248.
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3. The integrative approach is best suited to the
determination of computer copyright
infringement.
Certain commentators have argued against the Whelan in-
tegrative approach and claimed that other tests, such as a two-stage
Krofft approach is preferable. For instance, Hunter states that the
Krofft two step-test is "the preferred approach"62 but fails to give
any reasons why it should be considered superior to the Whelan/
Broderbund integrative test. As discussed previously, the Krofft
two-step test is ill-adapted to computer copyright subject matter be-
cause it excludes expert opinion in the evaluation of the issue of
whether the copyrightable expression of plaintiff's work was in-
fringed by defendant's work. It may be well suited to infringement
of musical scores and cartoon characters, but it is not suited to eval-
uating infringement of computer programs. In fact, there are no
other systematic similarity tests which stand as a serious contender
to the integrative test.
The focus of this essay on the rebuttal of commentators critical
of the Whelan/Broderbund approach should not obscure the fact
that many commentators have recognized the superiority and
promise of the integrative test of substantial similarity for computer
copyright.63
V. CONCLUSION
While some courts and commentators have been vociferously
critical of the Whelan/Broderbund approach, there remains a con-
fusion and lack of uniformity in the application of substantial simi-
larity tests to computer subject matter. The general trend of the law
after Whelan is toward the adoption of the integrative test for com-
puter copyright infringement, which is the wisest approach to the
62. Hunter, supra note 6, at 101-02. Other commentators have advocated the archaic
and maladapted Arnstein or Krofft two-step tests for computer program and output copyright
infringement. Walter, supra note 43, at 128.
63. See, e-g., Sundholm II, supra note 6, at 371, 399-404 (1987); Sundholm I, supra note
6; Susan A. Dunn, Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software,
38 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1986); Stephen R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process, or Protected?: Deter-
mining the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MicH. L.
REV. 866 (1990); Jack Sholkoff, Note, Breaking the Mold: Forging a New and Comprehensive
Standard for Protection for Computer Software, 8 CoMPuTER/L.J. 389 (1988); Anthony L.
Clapes et a]., Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1511 (1987); Ronald L. Johnston &
Allen R. Grogan, Copyright Protection for Command Driven Interfaces, COMPUTER LAW.,
June 1991, at 1; Janice M. Mueller, Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Com-
puter User Interfaces, 9 COMPUTER/L.J. 37 (1989).
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social engineering of technological progress in this area. Yet it is
likely that the "cultural lag" of legal theories behind advancing
technology will continue and many courts can be realistically ex-
pected to continue to apply a panoply of il-suited tests to computer
copyright cases and continue to cling to the archaic Synercom ra-
tionale and anti-protectionist approaches. Although it is clear that
the Whelan/Broderbund integrative approach is the wave of the fu-
ture, it is equally clear that absent legislative interdiction or a
Supreme Court opinion establishing the Whelan/Broderbund in-
tegrative substantial similarity test as the proper uniform test for
the evaluation of computer copyright infringement, the future direc-
tion of the law in this area will continue to be marked by contro-
versy, resistance, non-uniformity, and unpredictability regarding
how and when courts will enforce computer copyrights. The real-
ism of Charles Horton Cooley seems an appropriate estimation of
the future of this area of law:
As regard the proximate future I see little to justify any form of
facile optimism, but conceive that, though the world does move,
it moves slowly, and seldom in just the direction we hope. There
is something rank and groping about human life, like the growth
of plants in the dark: if you peer intently into it you can make
out weird shapes, the expression of forces as yet inchoate and
obscure; but the growth is toward the light.64
64. CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, SOCIAL PROCESS 409 (1966).
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